
I used to teach a seminar on law and moral character for law and graduate students. Readings came from the Greeks and Romans, the Bible, the Fathers, Thomas Aquinas, early English and American writers, and twentieth and twenty-first century thinkers. One of the assigned readings was a law review article by a woman who argued for what she called virtue jurisprudence. By this, she meant that in choosing judges, it’s more important that nominees have moral virtue than that they have the correct approach to the interpretation of the law. It turned out, though, that what she meant by having moral virtue was holding opinions just like hers, which made “virtue jurisprudence” a euphemism for results-oriented jurisprudence. In other words: “Never mind what the law actually says. A judge who does what I want done is a moral person, and a judge who does what I don’t want done is an immoral person.”
Some of my students noticed her sleight-of-hand. Others didn’t.
So virtue is merely having the right opinions, is it? This view is widely held. A virtuous person is a liberal, say liberals; a virtuous person is a conservative, say conservatives. You “signal” your virtue by expressing liberal or conservative opinions, depending on the audience.
Surely this can’t be right. Virtue couldn’t be the same as holding the opinions toward which we incline. But this raises a question. Do we really want to say that there is no relation at all between virtue and true opinions? If a man holds the “opinion” that he may lie, steal, or use cheat to bring about what he wants, he is not a man of virtue. Sorry.
So there are some connections between virtue and true opinions. What are they? Virtue is a “habit of the heart,” a settled disposition to make choices in certain ways.
First, our choices must comply with the general principles of the natural law, well summarized by the Ten Commandments. Worship God. Don’t murder. Be faithful to your spouse. All that these precepts imply, all that they presuppose, and all the related precepts for which they are placeholders.
Second, our choices must be prudent. Of the classical virtues of justice -- temperance, fortitude, and prudence -- prudence is the one most closely connected to the contents of our minds. For example, it’s one thing to know that I must care for my children, honor my parents, and love my neighbor, but another to know how to do that. These matters can’t be exhausted by a set of written rules, but require prudent judgment.
Of course some people do make wiser judgments of prudence than others, but disagreements about, say, whether misbehaving children are better corrected by withdrawal of privileges or other penalties do not necessarily reflect differences in virtue. I hasten to add, though, that opinions contrary to the general principles of the natural law can never be called prudent. Suppose someone says “In my opinion inconvenient children should be tortured.” Nope. Inadmissible.
End of blog post.
“But professor, you’ve strayed from the topic. Now you’re talking about life in general. At the beginning you were talking about judges, remember?”
Very well. Not end of blog post. Back to judges.
Because virtue requires honoring the general principles of the natural law – principles which are not only right for all of us, but even, at some level, known to all of us, even if we pretend otherwise -- no judge may be considered virtuous if he allows the legislators to violate them. For example, no matter what the legislators enact, the judge should not allow the state to enslave women or exterminate persons of Polish descent. But virtue neither requires nor allows a judge to substitute his prudential judgment for the prudential judgment of the legislators. For example, judges have no special qualification for deciding whether tariffs are a good or bad way to promote the common good. In such matters they should defer to legislators, because making prudent laws is what legislators are for. Just try to imagine what it would be like to have no laws, and instead have judges decide what to do about everything case by case.
In short: Legislative and judicial virtue are not precisely the same. Legislative virtue requires making the wisest possible prudential judgments in accord with the natural law. Judicial virtue also requires honoring the natural law, but insofar as the statutory law conforms to its foundational principles, judicial virtue lies in honoring the statutory law too.
And yes, contrary to the scholar with whom I began, it follows that having the right approach to the interpretation of law matters after all. The judge can’t defer to a standard he doesn’t understand, and shouldn’t be allowed to make up his standard all by himself.