Maybe Not the ONLY One

Sunday, 06-07-2015

“The only ultimate disaster that can befall us, I have come to realize, is to feel ourselves at home here on earth.”

-- attributed to Malcolm Muggeridge

Tomorrow:  Proving Natural Law

 

The Other Thing the Sexuality Debate Is About

Saturday, 06-06-2015

Could it be that for many people the debate about homosexuality has less to do with homosexual than heterosexual behavior?

Consider the popular line, “They can’t help how they feel.”  This proposition is the minor premise of an implied syllogism, the major premise of which may be put, “To act upon a desire which one cannot help feeling is always blameless.”

Is the major premise persuasive?  Hardly.  Many an adulterer might say in perfect sincerity that he can’t help wanting to sleep with his neighbor’s wife; many a thief, that he can’t help wanting his victim to be few dollars poorer.  It doesn’t follow that these persons are blameless for acting on their desires.

We accept such absurd postulates not because they persuade us, but because they provide excuses for our own bad behavior.  “I can’t help wanting to sleep with everyone who wears a skirt, therefore ….”

Tomorrow:  Maybe Not the ONLY One

 

Why Does the Regulator Regulate?

Friday, 06-05-2015

What are we to think of seemingly irrational government regulations, such as the proposed rule which would treat a mud puddle on a farmer’s land the same as a navigable river?  I suppose there might somewhere exist a few addle-pated regulators who really believe that the future of the planet depends on such edicts, but there couldn’t be many of them.  I think there is more to it.

The regulator’s frame of mind is suspicious in principle of all private power.  To his busybody way of thinking, it is almost beside the point whether the mud puddle diktat is needed or would do any good.  He views the rule as good just because it is a rule, for the farmer must be broken to discipline, like any young horse with too much spirit.

Tomorrow:  The Other Thing the Sexuality Debate Is About

 

The Wrong Way to Wake Up

Thursday, 06-04-2015

“Men seek stranger sins or more startling obscenities as stimulants to their jaded sense.  They seek after mad oriental religions for the same reason.  They try to stab their nerves to life, if it were with the knives of the priests of Baal.  They are walking in their sleep and try to wake themselves up with nightmares.”

-- G.K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man

Tomorrow:  What Makes the Regulator Regulate?

 

Why Is There Something, and Not Rather Nothing?

Wednesday, 06-03-2015

To the argument that the universe was caused by God, the village atheist retort is “Oh yeah?  Then what caused God?”

But the argument isn’t that every being requires a cause.  The village atheist is quite correct that if B causes A, C causes B, D causes C, and so on without end, we have a problem.  Nothing has ultimately been explained.

Rather the argument is that every contingent being requires a cause – every being that doesn’t have to be.  In reality the impossibility of endless regress makes the case for God, not against Him, because the regress continues only until it reaches a necessary being.

Tomorrow:  The Wrong Way to Wake Up

 

A Dialogue on Natural Law, Part 10 of 10

Tuesday, 06-02-2015

Well, your little digression about Christianity has been interesting, but it only strengthens my feeling that natural law theory is too religious.

What do you mean by "too religious"?

You only say there is a God because of the Bible.

I say there is a God because His reality is by far the best explanation of a great many features of our existence.  Including the fact that we exist.  The Bible agrees, but it would be true even if there were no Bible.

Be that as it may, morality stems from human need and interest.

Is this what you mean?  We are so made that we need to love God; we are so made that we need to love our neighbors; we are so made that we need to develop the virtues.  Also, we are so made as to be interested in truth; we are so made as to be receptive to the demands of friendship; we are so made as to be attracted, despite ourselves, to moral goodness.  These are what I call human need and interest -- the needs and interests which arise from the design of human nature.

No, that's not what I mean.

Then what do you mean?

I'm not sure, but not that.

Could it be that you want man to be to himself what God has been to man hitherto?

What if I do?  What would be wrong with that?

I see three problems with it, all very practical.  The first problem is that if man is to assume the office of God to himself, he will have to square it with the present occupant.  I think he may find that difficult.

Not if there is no God.

That's a mighty big counterfactual.  But the second problem is that you're too late.  Man has already been created.  He has already been provided with being.  It is too late for him to give himself a different being than he has.

But it's not too late to change it.

To monkey with it, you mean.  The third problem is that when you say "man," you mean some men.

Why?

You say you want man to be to himself what God has been to man.  But what God has been to man is man's absolute superior, and man cannot be his own superior.  A thing can be equal to itself, but it cannot be greater than itself.  So when you say you want man to be to himself what God has been to man hitherto, you mean you want some men to be to other men what God has been to man.  You want some men to be the absolute superiors of others.  I assume --

That's not what I --

Let me finish.  I assume that you want to be in the former group and not in the latter.  And so when you say morality stems from human need and interest, you mean you want it to stem from your needs and interests, over against the needs and interests of the others.

That's not what I mean at all.

Forgive me, but it is exactly what you mean.  You say you want to change the human design.  But in that case there must be two groups:  Those who cause the change, and those who result from it.  And the former hold all the cards.

The future men will thank us for it.

If you have changed them, will they be men?

Back to the Beginning:  A Dialogue on Natural Law, Part 1

Should We Have a Confessional State?

Monday, 06-01-2015

Monday again – student letter day.  To answer the writer’s question, I’ve borrowed from my chapter “The Strange Second Life of Confessional States,” in Paul R. Dehart and Carson Holloway, Reason, Revelation, and the Civic Order: Political Philosophy and the Claims of Faith (2014).

Question:

“Since you do not believe it is possible to be ‘neutral’ between religion and irreligion, do you think we should endorse religion – that we should have a confessional state?”

Reply:

In asking whether we should have a confessional state, I think you are assuming that at present we don’t have a confessional state.  If we use the term “religion” broadly enough to include any system of life and belief, then I think that we do.  The liberal state may not admit that it has any convictions, but this does not mean that does not have any.  It may claim like John Rawls that it suspends judgment among all “comprehensive doctrines,” but this does not mean that it suspends it.

You are viewing the alternatives this way:

Confessional state: The government acts on the basis of a set of moral and religious assumptions.

Non-confessional state: The government suspends judgment about moral and religious matters.

By contrast, I maintain that all states are confessional in the sense that they operate on the basis of some view of the world, or some alliance of such views.  But the differences among the different kinds of confessional state are deeply important.  I view the alternatives this way:

Type I confessional state:   The convictional basis of the state is neither declared nor coerced.

Type II confessional state:  The convictional basis of the state is declared but not coerced.

Type III confessional state:  The convictional basis of the state is coerced but not declared.

Type IV confessional state: The convictional basis of the state is both declared and coerced.

Not even a Type I state, if there could be such a thing, would be religiously neutral.  To say that the state should neither declare nor enforce its convictions is to imply that those religions that want it to do so are — at least to this extent — simply wrong.  That is not a suspension of judgment; it is a judgment.

England under Henry VIII and China under Mao Zedong were Type IV confessional states.  The fundamental convictions underlying state policy were explicitly acknowledged and solemnly avowed— in the former case, the Protestantism of the Church of England, in the latter case, the eschatology of the Communist Man forming under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.  Moreover, these confessions were enforced.  I certainly do not say that the two states were equally rigorous.  Henry’s was no picnic but Mao’s was infinitely harsher.

Though claiming to seek a non-confessional state, liberalism seeks a Type III confessional state.  Under its influence, the state increasingly attempts to coerce the consciences of those who follow non-liberal systems of life and belief, even while pretending to be neutral.  To be sure, such a state is not transparently or coherently confessional, in the sense of solemnly avowing its true commitments.  Yet it is not without solemn avowals.  It is an opaque and incoherent confessional state, solemnly avowing that its discriminatory acts are required by its determination not to discriminate.

At the time of its founding, the American republic was a Type II confessional state, for although it frankly declared its commitments, it declined to compel belief in them.  The convictional basis of the state is most clearly expressed not in our founding legal document, the Constitution, but in our founding political document, the Declaration of Independence.  Not only did it identify commitments to natural law and natural rights, but it went on to identify their source, for it said that “the laws of Nature” were the laws of “Nature’s God.” This confession was fairly ecumenical.  Though most of the Founders were Protestants, the Declaration did not go so far as to identify Nature’s God with God as Protestants understood Him.  It went only so far as to privilege systems of life and belief that shared a view of God that was creational, monotheistic, moral in the sense of the Ten Commandments, and providential, with a high view of the inviolable worth of every human being.

The Founders, having a higher view of the possibilities of human reason than, say, the followers of John Rawls, considered the truth of these principles to be accessible to all men of good will, even apart from the biblical revelation from which they drew them.  In their view, it may be reasonable to expect some people to reject the laws of Nature and Nature’s God.  But it is not reasonable to reject them.

Tomorrow:  A Dialogue on Natural Law, Part 10 of 10