The Underground Thomist
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Annals of LimerickSunday, 12-14-2014
I have a half-baked theory that people in different disciplines are attracted to different kinds of jokes. Physicists seem to be especially fond of limericks: There was a young lady from Bright, Whose speed was much faster than light. She set out one day In a relative way, And came back on the previous night. Perhaps philosophers too. For what it’s worth, here is one of my own coinage: To a Cartesian thinker named Duzz There came a most fabulous buzz: "For I not only think, But I also have thought. So I not only am, but I was." Are there any Thomistic limericks? There ought to be. The angelic doctor staunchly approved "words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight," saying "man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed." I know a near-limerick by St. Thomas himself. In a prayer of thanksgiving he wrote for use in Mass, the middle sentence asks “May [the sacrifice] purify me from sin, do away with my evil desires and passions, bring me charity and patience, humility and obedience, and strengthen me in all virtue.” The great Catholic apologist, Msgr. Ronald A. Knox, pointed out in 1925 that this uplifting petition has a limerick’s pattern of rhymes -- though not quite a limerick’s rhythm (which would have sounded cheeky in a prayer!): Sit vitiorum meorum evacuatio, Concupiscentiae et libidinis exterminatio, Caritatis et patientiae, Humilitatis et obedientiae, Omniumque virtutum augmentatio. If you do know any Thomistic limericks, let me know. There are only two rules: They have to be funny, and they have to scan.
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Fragment from an Earlier CivilizationSaturday, 12-13-2014First freedom meant our noble power of rational and moral self-direction. Then it meant the mere absence of restraints on our will, so long as we were not violating moral law. Then it meant the absence of any restraints whatsoever. Finally it meant the sheer power to act immorally and irrationally, even if the power of rational and moral self-direction were taken from us. Insofar as this is an illness of the mind, even to recognize its progress is to begin its cure. Insofar as it is an illness of the heart -- Here the manuscript breaks off.
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Curiosity as the Enemy of WonderFriday, 12-12-2014If you want to win murmurs of approval, quote Anatole France: “The whole art of teaching is only the art of awakening the natural curiosity of young minds for the purpose of satisfying it afterwards.” If you would like to evoke little gasps of admiration, follow up with Albert Einstein: “It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education. It is, in fact, nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry.” The problem is that the curiosity-as-holiness line is carelessly undiscriminating, and at best half-true. Here is the true half: In itself, the knowledge of truth is good. Aristotle says philosophy begins in wonder. John Paul II says everyone wonders, and in that sense everyone is a philosopher. Thomas Aquinas says it is man’s natural vocation to seek truth, especially the truth about God. We are made, among other things, to know, as no other animal is made to know. But the way one goes about pursuing knowledge may be right or wrong. For example, some seek knowledge for the sake of doing evil, like the military scientists who study how to “hack” the brains of soldiers so they will be unable to disobey orders. Some seek it for the sake of pride, like the clever fellows at the company Biotransplant who implanted the nuclei of cells from a human fetus into the enucleated ovum of a sow. Some even seek it for the sake of morbid pleasure, like the witty biologists some years ago who cut off the heads and tails of centipedes and stitched the stumps together to see if the hapless creatures would run in circles. If you would rather not pick on scientists, pick another profession, say, journalism. There is plenty of guilt to go around. Mere curiosity is to the tender love of truth as voyeurism is to marital love. That is why the ancients made distinctions. They accounted wonder a natural inclination, and the humble pursuit of knowledge to be a high virtue. But they reserved the word curiositas for seeking knowledge in ways it never should be sought.
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Empathy as the Enemy of Proper SympathyThursday, 12-11-2014Sympathy is merciful compassion for the other person; empathy is feeling what the other person feels. These two are often confused. How often have you heard the cynical remark that Mary’s sympathy for Clara is superficial or insincere just because she doesn’t feel what Clara feels? But she shouldn’t feel what Clara feels. For what if Clara is paralyzed with sorrow? Would it really be praiseworthy for Mary to feel just the same? She could do Clara no good if she were paralyzed too. Or what if Clara is longing to have her drug habit satisfied? True compassion is in the service of Clara’s good; in this case it longs for Clara not to be satisfied. As these examples show, not only are sympathy and empathy different things, but they may even be enemies. The former is a virtue; the latter isn’t. Among other things, this refutes the Impartial Spectator theory of ethics, which holds that we ought to act as a universal empathizer would act – someone who perfectly feels everything that everyone else feels and then acts the way that makes him feel best. It also explodes the notion so prevalent in our culture that cruelty is denying other people what they feel they must have. Such attitudes destroy friends, undermine love, and even disorder the law.
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Which Side Guessed Better?Wednesday, 12-10-2014
What we call the U.S. Constitution is really our second constitution. The first, drafted during the War of Independence, was called the Articles of Confederation. So the battle over the ratification of the Constitution was not over whether the thirteen colonies should unite, because they were already united. It was about how to improve their cooperation. Amending the Articles of Confederation was quite difficult. After the Continental Congress called a constitutional convention to streamline the process of drafting amendments, the convention violated its instructions, threw the Articles out the window, and drafted a completely new instrument of unity without a ghost of authorization. One side in the ensuing controversy, which came to be called Federalists, favored ratifying the new document. The other, called Anti-Federalists even though they believed even more fiercely in federalism, favored rejecting it. In the Anti-Federalist view, the proposed new Constitution was not only the product of an illegal conspiracy, but also dangerously flawed. We know which side won. But which side’s guesses were closer to the mark? Judge for yourself. Here are some Federalist and Anti-Federalist expectations about what would happen if the new Constitution was ratified. Judicial power. Federalists believed the judiciary would be the weakest branch of government; Anti-Federalists were convinced it would become ever stronger and more arbitrary, and that Congress would fail to keep it in check. Judicial activism. Anti-Federalists thought judges would become activists, continually increasing their own jurisdiction, ruling with less and less attention to what the Constitution actually says; Federalists denied this would happen Legislative power. Federalists thought the legislature would be the strongest branch; Anti-Federalists thought the other two branches would be much stronger than the Federalists expected. Elasticity. Anti-Federalists thought Congress would abuse the "necessary and proper clause,” also called the “elastic clause,” to make laws about all sorts of matters that were supposed to be left to the states; Federalists foresaw no such thing. Sensitivity of Congress to popular opinion. Federalists thought the House of Representatives would be sensitive to every little change in the mood or opinion of the people, so that a wiser, more experienced, and more stable Senate would be necessary to keep the House in check; Anti-Federalists thought both Senate and House of Representatives would become increasingly distant from the people and indifferent to their concerns. Popular confidence in Congress. Federalists thought Congress, especially the House of Representatives, would enjoy the people's supreme confidence and sympathy; Anti-Federalists thought it would fall into distrust and disrepute. Congressional turnover. Federalists thought there would be a great deal of turnover in every election to the legislature; Anti-Federalists though extreme turnover would be the exception, so that Congress would come to resemble a closed aristocracy. Congressional power to raise an army. Federalists thought that the Congressional power to raise an army would be used only when necessary because of the threat of war; Anti-Federalists thought it would be used to raise a standing army of permanent soldiers ready for action even in peacetime, and put to use for questionable purposes. Whether the army will be safe. Federalists thought any army that may be raised from time to time would be well-regulated and safe for the republic; Anti-Federalists thought that it would be destructive to liberty, because it would be distinct from the people, operating under its own laws and discipline. Manipulation of elections. Anti-Federalists thought that in order to manipulate electoral outcomes, Congress would abuse its power to revise state-drafted electoral regulations; Federalists denied this would happen. Concurrent general powers of taxation. Federalists thought giving a "general" power of taxation not only to states but also to the federal government would work fine; Anti-Federalists thought it would lead to such high federal taxes that the states would find it difficult to use the same methods to raise revenue, so that their independence would be placed at risk. Cancellation. Federalists thought the rise of majority factions – including political parties – would be prevented by the competition of opposing factions in Congress. Anti-Federalists didn't buy this argument. Presidential power. Anti-Federalists thought the vagueness of the definition of the chief executive’s power would encourage abuse; Federalists thought the executive would be sufficiently controlled by checks and balances. Presidential elections. Federalists expected that in almost every presidential election, there would be a crowd of candidates, so that the Electoral College would merely winnow the field, with the final decision being made by the House of Representatives -- the result being a compromise in which large states would dominate in the first phase of selection, but large and small states would be balanced in the second. I don't know whether any Anti-Federalists expressed views on the matter.
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We Have Crossed the LineTuesday, 12-09-2014
So wrote Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 84. He was speaking of one of the items proposed for a federal bill of rights, the freedom of the press. I am not thinking of that, but of a different item. I believe we have crossed the Hamiltonian line in the defense of conscience and religious liberty. Once upon a time, it may have been effective to put abstract guarantees of liberty of conscience and free exercise of religion in bills of rights and statutory enactments. If it was ever effective, however, it no longer is now, because terms like “conscience,” “religion,” and “liberty” have been so thoroughly vitiated. The judgment of conscience, separated from the knowledge of natural law, is viewed as meaning feelings of indignation that anyone should dare to judge my conduct. The duty of religion, alienated from the Creator to whom honor and obedience are due, is viewed as meaning personal eccentricities and baseless scruples in the name of which I demand special treatment. The boon of liberty, torn asunder from the duties it empowers us to perform, is viewed as meaning getting to do what I want to. We must not play that game. Conscience must be protected, and yes, in the long run we must rehabilitate these compromised terms. But in the short run, we must admit that the terms are compromised, and stop using them in the laws. Statutes which do employ them will at best confuse people, and at worst backfire. They will endanger the very things they are meant to protect. For example, if I say that my conscience forbids me to give support to the killing of babies, immediately someone will say that his conscience demands compelling everyone to pitch in for “health care,” by which he means the killing of babies. Therefore I say to lawmakers: Do not throw pearls before swine. Do not implore respect for such things as “conscience,” “religion,” or “liberty” from people who have no idea what these terms means. Yes, find ways to protect authentic conscience and religious liberty – scarcely anything could be more important. But find ways to do so without using the terms. Do not forbid abstract categories of acts; forbid acts. This will require that evils be targeted more closely. For example, one of the greatest contemporary threats to genuine conscience is that health care workers can be required to take part in abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. Forego the word “conscience.” Simply propose that no one may be required or commanded to take innocent human life, or to participate formally in its taking. The same approach may be taken toward attempts to coerce people to commit other evils. Such a law will be difficult to enact and even more difficult to sustain, but may mean a great deal. In our favor is the fact that even though the people no longer understand what conscience is, they still have consciences -- and they do still understand what killing is.
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We Interrupt This ProgramMonday, 12-08-2014
As many readers of this blog know, my Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law was published a few months ago. There were some glitches with its partner volume, but I’m glad to say that the unglitched Companion to the Commentary is now available for download. The two books work together, and the Companion -- the supplement to end all supplements – is free. So if you’re interested in the Treatise at all, this is a big deal. Please tell your friends, teachers, students, and acquisitions librarians. Here’s the backstory. Many moons ago, when I had finally sent my promised manuscript on Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law to Cambridge University Press, all seemed well. Cambridge liked it. The reviewers liked it. There was one problem: Without realizing it, I had submitted a manuscript almost twice as long as it was supposed to be. It would have produced a book of about 800 pages. Can you imagine curling up in front of the fireplace with a granite block like that? You would have needed a forklift to carry it. And who could have afforded it? The editors and I hit on this solution: The book would be divided into two books. The Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law would still include the all-important line-by-line commentary on Questions 90-97 – the hugely important, central sections on law in general, the types of law, eternal law, natural law, and human law. But two big chunks of the book would emigrate to a second book which we would call the Companion to the Commentary: First, all the thematic discussions I provide over and above the line-by-line commentary, and second, additional line-by-line commentary on excerpts from Questions 98-108, on divine law. The Commentary is published both in print and electronically, and you have to pay for it. The Companion is available only as a PDF, but distributed for free -- a huge bonus. Of course both books are under copyright. You can find more information, including samples of the text and endorsements by other scholars, here.
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“Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government.”
We interrupt this series of blog posts for an important announcement.