The Underground Thomist
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The Future of the Life of the Mind (2)Monday, 02-01-2016
Question:I just wanted to write to say thank you for “The Future of the Life of the Mind,” and for your references to the Sertillanges book in other blog posts. Encouragement in the “traditional” intellectual life is rare. I’m also encouraged by your observation that intellectual organizations these days are "all an experiment and adventure.” Currently I am in an MSIS program (that’s Master of Science in Information Sciences), and we hear the same thing about the careers we’re going into in libraries and archives and who knows what else. It can be too easy to assume that everything is decaying, the culture is collapsing, etc. etc., and voices like yours are invaluable to remind us that no, it’s not all horrible. Relatedly, could you give a few examples of those "few beautiful successes” that you refer to? Or advice on how to organize communities of serious thought? Reply:I can’t tell you how to organize them, because I don’t have an organizational gene. (There is another notch on my chromosome where the sports gene ought to be, but that’s another story). Still, I think can tell you a little more about their varieties. Probably very few communities of serious thought develop because someone says, “Say, let’s develop a community of serious thought.” At present, most such communities organize in the hope of doing some part of the work that universities ought to be doing but aren’t. Consider for example Thomas Aquinas College, in Santa Paula, California, which aims at providing a unified liberal arts education. Students have very few electives, but they acquire the intellectual virtues; they are taught how to think. By contrast, the Institute for the Psychological Sciences, in Arlington, Virginia, aims at providing graduate-level professional training in a single discipline, the healing of the mind, but from a consistently Catholic understanding of the nature of the human person. Considering the depth of the Catholic philosophical tradition, you might think that this would be one of the perspectives on display in a public university, but you would be wrong. A third example is the religious orders which practice scholarship in the service of their spiritual vocations. Included here are those lay members called tertiaries, who live in the world. Although religious orders may seem very unlike the former two examples, they are alike in that their work too is part of a broader work. In the case of the Dominicans, for instance, that broader work is preaching, teaching, and using the intellect to combat deadly moral, intellectual, and spiritual fallacies. You may think I shouldn’t include religious orders in this list of “new” forms of community, since they have been around for many centuries. But there are always new orders with new charisms, as well as old ones whose charisms are renewed. I think many of the orders that practice scholarship may be doing things differently as universities continue to forget what universities once tried to be. For now, perhaps the most important dimension of variation among the new communities of scholars is just what relationship they have to establishment universities. Some come into being to compete with them. This task is challenging for many reasons, not least of them the fact that accreditation organizations are often dominated by persons who are hostile to their aims. Others exist as parts of establishment universities, for example as Western Civilization honors programs, right in the belly of the beast. A few organize in the ambitious hope of encouraging the renewal of their host institutions, but most begin with the more modest goal of providing enclaves of sanity. Surprisingly, officials in the host institutions sometimes welcome such organizations, if only for a while, just to placate donors and other parties who are looking over their shoulders. On the other hand, since such organizations cannot be truly independent of their hosts, they risk what is called “capture” by hostile forces in the host institutions, and then their mission is corrupted. Still other scholarly communities exist alongside establishment universities, offering resources, encouragement, and comradeship for the dwindling number of sane scholars who continue to work in those schools. The more successful of such para-university organizations cultivate collaboration between scholars in the university and in the para-university, while maintaining financial and organizational independence. But they cannot exist in isolation from the surrounding community. Because they need to disseminate what they learn, and also because they need to attract donors, their success depends largely on community outreach. Too much success can be dangerous, because it makes such organizations targets for another kind of “capture”; over time they may drift from their missions in the same way most institutions do. The smartest ones try to set up safeguards, if not to prevent drift – that may be impossible – then at least to slow it down. The last sort of scholarly community lives more or less apart from universities. Such forms of association are neither competitors with universities, parts of them, nor deliberately crafted to exist alongside them. I say “more or less” because at least for now, it would be virtually impossible for them to live just as though universities did not exist. For example, scholars who are members of religious orders may have been recruited as university students, and may have received their scholarly training in universities. For obvious reasons, though, as the universities continue to go crazy, such patterns become problematic. If change is not already under discussion, I expect that it will be. In the meantime, big and little tremors are taking place in scholarly and professional associations, as the old ones succumb to institutional sclerosis, ideological mania, or both, and as new kinds of networks are emerging. Thank God, frivolities like Twitter are not the only results of the new technologies. Scholars can now communicate, associate, and even publish in all sorts of new ways. Here too, not all new developments are good. But some of them are very good, and some may become better than they are. Despite the rigidity of the establishment universities, the world of scholarship is increasingly fluid. Twenty years from now, much of what I have just written will have to be revised. In the meantime, don’t assume that if you don’t see anything, then nothing is happening. That is like thinking that the mother isn’t pregnant, just because you can’t see the baby in the womb. The first movements may be like the fluttering of a moth, but in time you can feel the child kick.
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PassionSunday, 01-31-2016
There are moments when I could imagine being a lexicographer. One of the most interesting stories of the last few centuries must be how rapturous intensity of feeling came to be regarded as a good thing rather than a bad one, and the terms we use to describe it became words of praise. This is especially true of the word “passion”: “I just love your passion for your work.” “The applicant is passionately committed to his studies.” “Senator Fogbound has the rare ability to arouse the passion of his followers.” Contrast that last line with the view of the American Founders, who thought of passion as the great danger of republics. Among their chief goals was to make legislation so slow that any passion which does arise will have ample time to dissipate. Understand me: Emotions aren’t bad in themselves, as the Stoics morbidly thought. But to be good, they have to be regulated. Until very recently in history, almost all wise men agreed that such feelings as fear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity, pleasure, and pain may be felt both too much and too little. What if I am so fearful that I cannot face danger, or so fearless that I cannot learn caution? Unfortunately, when we praise someone for being passionate, we don’t mean that he feels his emotions at the right times, toward the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way. We merely mean that he feels them intensely – that he is always either in the grip of an excitement, revving up to an excitement, or coming down from an excitement which we happen to find attractive ourselves. Even science museums and children’s indoor play centers strive for sensory overload. Love lyrics sound as though they were written by sociopaths and stalkers; they are so often about losing one’s mind, or losing control. The unforgivable sin in politics isn’t to be wicked, but to be boring. There is a lot of cultural blame to go around. The day the poet Shelley rhymed “madness” with “gladness,” he committed a fatal error. But the philosopher Hume was just as mad when he described reason as the “slave” of the passions. If that were the case with his own reasoning, then why should anyone suppose that his views could have merit? I have been promising my readers to try to end on upnotes, and I can. The one good thing about frenzy is that it takes far too much energy to maintain. If we can keep ourselves and our loved ones from succumbing, this too will pass.
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In God We Trust – Who, Me?Saturday, 01-30-2016
Question:Can you suggest – for starters -- just one thing to read about contemporary religion clause jurisprudence? Have you written anything about it? And what did the Framers themselves mean by the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses? Reply:Just one thing? Sure: Read Russell Hittinger, "The Supreme Court v. Religion," which is a chapter in his excellent book The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World. As Hittinger points out, you might think that the members of the Court would have the same view of the law, but different views of religion. Actually, they have very different views of the law, but surprisingly similar (and disturbing) views of religion. Since you are also interested in my take on these matters, take a look at my chapter, “The Strange Second Life of Confessional States,” in the very interesting anthology of Paul R. DeHart and Carson Holloway, Reason, Revelation, and the Civic Order: Political Philosophy and the Claims of Faith. But read the rest of those books too! Now as to those clauses. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The first part is the Establishment Clause, the second the Free Exercise clause. An “establishment of religion” is an official church, and the word “respecting,” in the Establishment Clause, means “about.” So the clause simply forbids the federal government from making laws on the subject of official churches. This means, among other things, that it tell the states whether to have official churches or not (six of the thirteen states did have them at that time), and it can’t set up a competing Church of the United States. So this was a federalism issue, not a religious liberty issue. Despite later claims to the contrary, it had nothing to do with “separating” Church and State; it was actually about separating the states from the federal government. This has now become moot, because for reasons having to do with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court now thinks that the Establishment Clause applies to the states too. The Free Exercise clause is a little more confusing. By the rules of statutory construction, in order to know the meaning of the statement that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, we must figure out what the Framers and Ratifiers meant by “religion,” what they meant by the “exercise” of religion, and what they meant by the exercise of religion being “free” – and they didn’t make it easy. Still, there are plenty of clues, for example in the Declaration of Independence. As I read such tea leaves, by “religion” they meant providential moralistic monotheism, with a high view of the human person; that by “exercise” they meant action, as well as belief; and that by “free” they meant unhindered within the bounds of the common good, as illuminated by natural law. But our contemporary jurisprudes pronounce upon what the Free Exercise clause means without defining any of those words. Consequently, there is no telling what they will say the clause means from one case to the next. If we take the two clauses to mean something like what I think the Framers and Ratifiers meant -- first, that the federal government must stay out of the official religion business, but second, that within the bounds of the natural law people may worship God and act as their religiously informed consciences direct -- then the two clauses are perfectly compatible, and one can obey them both at the same time. But if we take the two clauses as our contemporary jurisprudes take them – they tend to think that the Establishment clause has something to do with restricting religion, but that the Free Exercise clause has something to do with loosening restrictions on it – then the two clauses are plainly inconsistent, so that to follow one is to violate the other. This is why they so often say that the two clauses express not Constitutional rules, but Constitutional “values” which must be “balanced” against each other. Translated, that means, “Never mind what the clauses mean; we, the judges, will tell you what must be done.” Religion clause jurisprudence makes a logical man want to pull his hair out. For example, a lot of the Establishment Clause cases go on and on about how the government must be “neutral” between religion and irreligion. Members of the Court have said, for example, that the reason why words like the references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance aren’t Constitutionally problematic is that because of rote repetition, they don’t mean anything to people any more. But the same members of the Court go on to say that such practices are very useful. For example, they inspire people to perform acts they wouldn’t otherwise perform. Now ask yourself: If these words really have lost their meaning, then how can they inspire people to do these things? What these judges mean is that the people who run things don’t believe them, but that certain fools do. Let us be found among those subtle fools whose strings aren’t so easy to pull. Trust God, but put not your trust in princes. Or candidates. Or judges.
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What I’ve Learned about Blogging (2)Thursday, 01-28-2016
Here is more I’ve learned about blogging. If you missed the previous post, you can pick it up here. When I first set up my website, my first thought was to make my other work easier for people to find and ruminate upon. I soon discovered that the maxim “If you build it, they will come” doesn’t apply to websites. You have to give people reasons to visit frequently. Those people tell other people about it, and there you go. But don’t be fooled. Not even occasional visitors will discover your website unless there is something for frequent visitors too. Posting often burns a lot of energy. Even if the purpose is to advance your other work, if you aren’t careful it will drain your time from it. So don’t even consider a daily blog unless you compose and proofread swiftly, you don’t suffer from writer’s block, and you’re highly disciplined. If you need to take a vacation from the blog, don’t just go away; do the posts for the time of your absence ahead of time. Otherwise, when you come back you may find yourself like Little Bo Peep: You’ve lost your readers and can’t tell where to find them. Keep lists of ideas, and chew on them. If you wake up with an idea in the wee of the morn’, don’t resolve to write it down when you get up; by then you won’t remember it. Get up and commit it to a note. As I learned when my children were born, sleep is overrated anyway (it was a great trade, by the way). Know what a blog can’t do. No matter how much your readers love reading, people don’t read on the web the same way they read books made from trees. Most of your posts should be short. You can provide links to books and to articles, but a blog is not a book or an article. Know who your audience is. I could write a blog that only specialists could understand – something like a rolling workshop among a few intensely interested people with similar obsessions. Or I could write a blog that only non-specialists would find interesting – something more like a radio broadcast. But what I write about, broadly, is ethics and politics, which means how to live. And I am one of those funny blokes who think that if you are going to write about something that concerns two audiences, then you have to offer something to both of them (at least sometimes). Once you push that first domino, the others start falling. The decisions you make about your audience shape all of your other decisions -- about topics, frequency of posts, length, style, whether to be humorous (perhaps I should say whether to try to be humorous), whether to run comments, whether to run letters, and even how attractive your page has to be to the eye. Perhaps the most important thing I’ve learned – and I’m still learning it -- is this. When I began, I already knew that anyone who reflects on the state of the culture will have to blow some blue notes on his horn. What I didn’t fully appreciate is that whether I blow them or not, more people are hearing the world in a minor key today than twenty years ago – and many are finding it very hard to bear. So I’m learning not to end on those blue notes. There is no need anyway, because I don’t believe in Fate; I believe in Providence. Long before we saw the gray banners of the neo-pagans, our foremothers and forefathers faced down the black ones of the pagans. And though I may be only a scullion, I seem to remember that when knights were slaying dragons, they always sang.
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What I’ve Learned about Blogging (1)Wednesday, 01-27-2016
A reader who is considering blogging asks me to blog about blogging. Since I’ve been at it for a few years, what have learned? Maybe not much. Presently the site is pulling five to six thousand hits a month. That may sound like a lot, but in the blogosphere, it isn’t really. Still, I’ve learned a few things. Consider one of my early posts, in which I did nothing but quote a pair of stickers seen on the same bumper of the same van in Austin, Texas: #1: Stop the Dissections: Have Respect for Life. #2: Pro-Choice and Proud of It. Today I would write that post differently. It was short, and that’s good; sometimes less is more. But too much less is still less. All the post did was call attention to the incoherency of urging mercy toward little lab animals yet mercilessness toward human babies. Lots of readers have noticed such things. I wasn’t telling them anything new. Besides, the post was a one-off, with no chance for development. How much more interesting it would have been to comment on why such contrary sentiments might have been combined. The reason is that so long as anyone remains obstinate in his support of abortion, he needs a way to drown the voice of his conscience and assure himself that he is really a good person. Probably the driver of the car supported kindness to animals not despite his support for slaying little children, but because of it. Had I written the post today, I would have made the point about conscience explicitly. That would have provided a better opening for subsequent posts to dig deeper. But I won’t do that digging this week! Tomorrow, more about blogging.
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The Future of the Life of the MindTuesday, 01-26-2016
If you think you are called to be a scholar of the liberal arts, I encourage you. But let me rattle your thinking a little about how to do it. When I was in grad school, that sort of young person assumed that there was one main way to pursue the life of the mind: To become an academic -- probably a college or university professor. For four reasons, the assumption is no longer a safe one. The first two reasons are unhappy ones. The third is mixed. The fourth is very happy, so this post will have a good ending. But stay with me. First: University colleges of liberal arts are becoming less and less hospitable to the kinds of scholarship that used to be their hallmark. Officially the study of the great literature and thought of the ages and trying to extend its insights is a good thing and what we all try to do, but the very phrase “Western civilization” makes many university faculty spit like cats. Officially the university adheres to no religion, but the unofficial religion is practical atheism. Officially it enforces no moral code, but it adheres strongly to the dictatorship of relativism. If you like that sort of thing, you will fit in quite well as a professor. But if you don’t, you may find it difficult. Second: The university is hardly a “university” in the original sense any more, because its citizens and subjects no longer believe in the universal truths which tie together all fields of knowledge and are the calling of all minds to find out. Having discarded its original mission, the institution tries desperately to justify itself by taking on odd jobs. Some of these odd jobs are worthwhile, but in each case someone else could do them much better or more cheaply. For granted the merit of football, why do we need a university to field a team? Granted the merit of job training, why is a university needed to teach recreational administration? Granted that a certificate of employability might be a good thing, what makes a university the best certifier? Granted the need for military and industrial research, couldn’t it be done by the military and by industry? And granted the need to prepare young people for adult responsibilities, is assembling them in vast numbers for four years, isolated from those very responsibilities, surrounded with temptations to party, really the best way to do it? Third: As the rest of the society begins to catch on that there is no good reason to have a single institution perform all the odd jobs it has accumulated, other parties are peeling them off and taking them over, one by one. For this reason, it seems unlikely that the current state of affairs can long continue, especially because it is inefficient and increasingly expensive. Universities have become like collections of unrelated objects tied together with thread, and the thread is coming loose. I suppose that counts as a good thing rather than a bad one, because it ought to come loose. But the unravelling it is going to cause a lot of pain in the meantime. Finally the happy reason for changing how one thinks about a life of scholarship. If one takes a long enough view of things, it is very happy indeed. Just because the universities are abandoning their original mission, persons who do believe in that mission are seeking other ways to take it up. Intellectual organizations of strange and diverse form are popping up in unexpected places. Some have resident scholars, others don’t. Some take students, others don’t. There is no blueprint for this sort of thing. It is all an experiment and adventure, with lots of disappointments and a few beautiful successes. So although for now, most young people who are genuinely called to scholarship will continue to seek employment in universities, this will change. Is scholarship your calling? Then get your sea legs, because you may need to keep your footing on a rolling deck. Be imaginative. Try things. Exchange ideas with others. Make time to read and write, even if you can’t give up your day job. Have respect for the old gatekeepers, but look for ways to get around them too. Find new ways to organize communities of serious thought. How do you think universities began in the first place? MORE ON MONDAY |
How My Law Profs Talk about RightsMonday, 01-25-2016
Question:My question is really double. Or triple. First, disparagement of natural law has been a common theme in most of my law school courses. I expected that. What I didn’t expect is that everyone calls natural law theory “natural rights theory.” Is there a historical or ideological reason for this change in terms? If so, could you comment on it? Second, my property casebook describes rights theorists as attempting to "identify individual interests that are so important from a moral point of view that they not only deserve legal protection but may count as ‘trumps’ that override more general considerations of public policy by which competing interests are balanced against each other. Such individual rights cannot legitimately be sacrificed for the good of the community." What accounts for this emphasis on the individual? I thought natural law focused on the common good. I'm trying to think of a prominent recent policy debate that highlights all of this in order to discuss it with my prof. Since natural law thinkers emphasize the good of families and children, the gay "marriage" controversy comes to mind, but I'm afraid that's too politically charged to allow my prof to respond dispassionately. Can you suggest any other examples? Reply:The difficulty you are having in communicating with your professor is probably due to the fact that you are thinking of the classical natural law tradition, but he is thinking of the revisionist movement which began in the early modern period and grew more and more radical. From the way these matters are discussed in most law schools, you might never know that there was a classical tradition. Revisionists speak as though nobody ever talked about rights before themselves. If they do mention the classical tradition, they speak as though it were a dusty historical curiosity. Actually a lot of people work in the classical tradition, and it is experiencing one of its periodic revivals. At the risk of repeating things I’ve said in snips and threads in other posts, let me try to pull the threads together. The classical tradition views rights as rooted in the eternal principles of right and wrong, so that there could never be a right to commit a wrong. However, the revisionists view rights as rooted in personal autonomy – in radical self-rule, or self-law. Don’t misunderstand: The classical tradition had certainly viewed persons as governing themselves under a higher law. But that is not what the revisionists mean. They view self-rule as the source of law, a “law” that each person gives himself. In their view there is no higher law. That’s one of the reasons for the terminological change which you’ve noticed. Although the early modern revisionists still used the language of natural law, they eviscerated it. Today’s revisionists just say “natural rights” -- or they drop the “natural” and say only “rights.” This revisionist view makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish autonomy from the sheer assertion of will; it seems to imply that one may make up one’s own right and wrong. Revisionists do say that in the exercise of liberty, individuals should agree not to infringe upon the liberty of others. But if individuals really do make up their own right and wrong, then it is difficult to see the force of this “should.” Why honor promises? Why care about the liberty of others at all? Although revisionists have offered a variety of solutions to this problem, such as mutual fear as a motivation for a social contract, classical natural law thinkers find none of these solutions convincing. Each solution relies covertly on the higher law which revisionism tries to do without. For without a higher law, why shouldn’t I agree to the supposed contract, but then break my promise? Why not board the train, but refuse to pay? Casebooks written by revisionists try to avoid the language of higher law, but then what do they mean by words like “good” or by euphemisms like “legitimate”? If there is no higher law, then then there is only power. From the classical point of view, revisionism is thoroughly confused. We do not rule ourselves; we participate in ruling ourselves under God. There really are “natural” rights, but they are not free-standing; they arise from natural law. They exist to safeguard the ability of all persons to do their duties and to have the freedom of action necessary to direct their lives in the ways which develop their human gifts in community with others, not only for their private good, but also for the good of their neighbors. Thus not only individuals, but also certain forms of association, such as families, voluntary organizations, and the Church, have rights, and these rights need to be codified with appropriate legal sanctions in order to protect them against the potential tyranny of other individuals, other social groups, or the state. You’re right that that the classical natural law tradition focuses on the common good – but justice is an element in the common good, and respect for both individual and organizational rights is an element of justice. Some rights are rights to have or receive something; for example, merchants have the right to payment from their customers, and children the right to care from their parents. Other rights are rights to do something; for example, a man and woman have a right to marry if there are no impediments to the union. Another useful distinction is among rights that are permissive, protective, or supportive. Religious liberty is an interesting case, because it is a right in all three senses. It permits each person to seek the truth about God, because seeking it is our duty and finding it our highest good; it protects each person in seeking the truth about God, by prohibiting others from unreasonably hindering the search; and it supports each person in seeking the truth about God, by obligating other people to give the seeker such aid as they reasonably can (though only the first two dimensions of this natural right can be enforced by civil rights). In Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law, I ask where the epitome of the classical tradition, St. Thomas, stands in all of this, since he says a lot about what is “right,” but not much about “rights.” It is easier to say what he doesn’t think: He would certainly reject the revisionist view which tries to root rights in radical self-rulership. What he would say think is a matter of dispute. I think the three most interesting possibilities are as follows. In my view, these three possibilities complement each other. First, natural rights may be simply implications of natural commands and prohibitions. For example, if the natural law forbids all from taking innocent human life, then each innocent person may be said to have a right not to have his life taken by others. This line of argument has been urged by John Finnis. Second, natural rights may be naturally protected permissions. Suppose, for example, that the natural law permits a man to marry a woman (provided certain conditions are met). Suppose further that the natural law forbids others from preventing him from doing so. Then he may be said to have a natural right to marry her. This trail has been followed by Brian Tierney. The third complementary possibility is that rights are grounded in essential humanity -- in the dignity of human beings as responsible persons. I have in mind what St. Thomas says about the difference between “royal and politic” rule and “despotic” rule, a distinction he borrows from Aristotle: For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right [facultatem] to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. By this “faculty,” this “something of their own,” St. Thomas here means merely the bare ability to resiSt. But other passages suggest that normally, human beings ought to have such an ability – that a certain constitutional respect is due to them just because they are persons rather than things, individual rational substances endowed by God with free will and moral capacities. Because of this dignity, the best human government requires an element of democracy (Summa Theologiae, I-II, Question 105, Article 1). Because of this it, subjects may sometimes – in fact must sometimes – disobey unjust laws (Question 96, Article 4). Because of it, not only individuals but even their licit forms of association enjoy certain privileges that no human ruler may abridge. And because of it, the Divine governor Himself, whose law is always just and who must not be disobeyed, rules us, His images, not as He rules the animals, but through the participation of our minds (Question 91, Article 2). We must step carefully here, for though the right to be ruled in a “royal and politic” manner may be natural, but it does not follow that it is unconditional. Many natural rights are conditional; for example, the right to a wage is conditioned on performing the labor. Another example is that when the citizens become so corrupt as to sell their votes, it may be necessary to deprive them of the privilege of choosing their own magistrates (Question 97, Article 1). And concerning the government of God Himself, St. Thomas agrees with the tradition that for those who are obstinate to the end, there is hell. Some Thomists are uneasy with the language of natural rights. The reasons for this disquiet are understandable. However firmly rights may be grounded in what is objectively just, grammatically speaking they seem to be subjective, just in the sense that they are “mine.” Of course, the same is true of duties, yet, psychologically, there is a difference. “My” duties direct my attention outward, to the persons toward whom I owe them. By contrast, “my” rights direct my attention inward, toward myself. This fact makes it very easy to view rights as though they were not really about objective moral realities, but “all about me” – about sheer self-assertion. The fear of these thinkers, then, is that talking too much about rights subtly influences us to accept a false view of rights, which may be true. To most Thomists, however, it seems unreasonable that we should avoid the language of natural rights just because the idea is so badly abused by revisionists. The reality of natural rights, properly understood, is a truth, knowable by reason. In this life, truth is always abused; even liars know that to be persuasive, they must fit as much truth into their lies as possible. Instead of avoidance, then, a better strategy (though perhaps a risky one) would seem to be redemption: To reclaim the spoiled language of natural rights, to rescue the concept from its abusers, to uproot it from the theory of radical self-rule and plant it again in the soil of natural law. I suppose all controversies are “politically charged.” But does any of this help you think of a controversy you can discuss with your professor without making him blow up like Vesuvius?
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