
The Underground Thomist
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False Light and Real DarknessThursday, 10-02-2014“Better real darkness than false light, say the saints; better real confusion than false clarity.” -- Inaugural address of Fr. Thomas Hopko, Dean, St. Vladimir's Orthodox Seminary (1993)
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Just for the RecordWednesday, 10-01-2014Several philosophers elsewhere on the web seem confused about whether I am an NNL theorist. That means a “new natural law” theorist, a follower of the basic goods approach of John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and Germain Grisez. Heavens, no, not at all. I am a traditional Thomist, and I’ve criticized the NNL theory in several places. Among other things, I think that its rejection of natural teleology is a mistake; that what it calls the “incommensurability thesis” -- the view that no fundamental good can be viewed as more important than any other – is false; and that its analysis of what it calls “the basic good of religion” is dreadfully misleading. But one can view a theory as fundamentally mistaken and still find something helpful in what its proponents have said. I have certainly borrowed and adapted one of Finnis’s ideas about the one-flesh unity of the husband and wife. As I would put it, neither of the two has “a reproductive system” – each has only half of one. The procreative purpose cannot be accomplished until they join. But notice that I have just referred to the inbuilt purpose of the sexual powers. Finnis would not do that, and he would regard my borrowing as illegitimate. I think his idea makes sense only in the context of natural teleology; he is trying to avoid it.
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Why We Should Think More Critically About So-Called Critical ThinkingWednesday, 10-01-2014Fallacies of reasoning fall come in two kinds. Logic textbooks focus on formal fallacies, slips in inference: “If all dogs have tails, then all animals with tails are dogs.” So-called critical thinking instruction tends to focus on informal fallacies, tricks of distraction: “Scientific people don’t believe in ghosts, so there must not be any ghosts.” “If we don’t change our mind about global warming, we’ll all drown!” “Everyone knows the moon is made of cheese.” "How can you be so unpatriotic as to criticize the President's proposal?" There certainly are such things as informal fallacies, and in the last four examples, the reasoning really is fallacious. Unfortunately, having been raised on bad critical thinking textbooks, most of my students think all appeals to such things as authority, fear, popular opinion, and shame are illegitimate. That’s utterly false. Let us think a little more critically about so-called critical thinking. Take authority: There is nothing wrong with asking a geologist about the chemical composition of limestone, since I can't possibly have first-hand knowledge of everything, and he knows more about limestone than I do. Careful use of authority serves the ends of reason provided that I have reasonable assurance of the supposed authority's honesty, reliability, and qualifications, the question asked concerns his own field of expertise, I consider not just his answers but the reasons he gives for them, and, if authorities differ, I consult the other ones too. Or take fear: Of course the mere fact that laws are backed up with fear of punishment does not prove that their principles are true. But laws are not illegitimate just because they depend on fear. Law is a teacher, and those who will not listen to reason must be instructed by penalties. Or popular opinion: We have no inside knowledge about what the moon is made of, but we do have inside knowledge of many other things – for example, the structure of human motivation. So, the fact that almost all people in all times and places would agree that they undertake each of their acts for the sake of some good is a strong argument that they really do. Though we may have forgotten, the classical philosophers understood this well Even shame: If I really have done wrong, then those who arouse my conscience are doing me a favor. They are asking me to pay attention to the data; they are calling my attention to something that deep down, I already know. Such an appeal to shame is entirely legitimate.
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One of the Unfortunate Attractions of CynicismTuesday, 09-30-2014"Whatever deviates from the plain path of duty, or contradicts received opinions, seems to imply strength of will, or a strength of understanding, which seizes forcibly on the attention. Whether it is fortitude or cowardice, or both, there is a strong propensity in the human mind, if its suspicions are once raised, to know the worst. .... When once the fairy dream in which we have lulled our senses or imagination is disturbed, we ... revenge ourselves for the cheat which we think has been put upon us, by laughing at the credulity of those who are still its dupes. Even the very love of virtue makes the mind ... impatient ... and prompts us to escape from tormenting suspense in total indifference, as jealousy cures itself by destroying its object.” -- William Hazlitt, Of Rochefoucault's Maxims
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On Not Being Jerked AroundMonday, 09-29-2014My new book has been published Although the puppet has no mind, it partakes of the intelligence of the puppeteer just in the sense that it is governed by his mind. The loyal and well-trained sheepdog participates in the intelligence of the shepherd in better way, because the sheepdog does have a mind, and can recognize commands. Yet the sheepdog does not understand why sheep should be herded; the idea of a reason why does not even occur to it. A beloved herding dog may try to herd all of the members of its human family into a single room. I have even seen a border collie “herd” all of the stones in the yard into a single pile. Herding is just something it does. More excellent by far is the way that a rational being participates in the intelligence of God, for our finite minds are so fashioned that in their limited way they can reflect His infinite thoughts. He could have jerked us around like the puppet. He could have directed us through instincts like the dog. He could have refused us any share in His providence. He could have arranged matters so that we never had to deliberate about what is to be done, never had to labor in order to grasp how the general principles of the natural law should be applied to the particular circumstances of our families, our friendships, or our commonwealths. That is not His way with us. We ask, “Why didn’t you make it easier?” That is like asking, “What is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou dost care for him?” -- but in the mode of a complaint.
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Something I Used to Think FalseSunday, 09-28-2014"The state exists simply to promote and protect the ordinary happiness of human beings in this life. A husband and wife chatting over a fire, a couple of friends having a game of darts in a pub, a man reading a book in his own room or digging in his own garden -- that is what the state is there for. And unless they are helping to increase and prolong and protect such moments, all the laws, parliaments, armies, courts, police, economics, etc., are simply a waste of time.” -- C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, 4:8.
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Why Courts Get Away with Balancing TestsSaturday, 09-27-2014Even when the Constitution flatly forbids doing something – for example, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging freedom of speech or press – courts often weigh competing considerations to decide whether the “something” may be done, pleading that the meaning of the prohibition isn’t clear. When courts require that different things be balanced, the only way to tell whether they have been balanced in the way the courts think they should be balanced is to go right back to the courts. So you can see why some judges would love balancing tests. They encourage litigation and make judges more important. They increase their power at the expense of the power of legislators. This is a dangerous tendency, because courts are far less well equipped to balance competing considerations than legislatures are. That is the sort of thing legislators are for. But wouldn’t this problem solve itself? The Framers expected each branch to be jealous of the power of the others, so one would expect legislators to use their checks to resist the judicial invention of balancing tests. One would think they would say that if it is really true that the meaning of a particular Constitutional prohibition isn’t clear, pinning its meaning down is a legislative, not a judicial job. On the contrary, when issues are so hot that legislators are afraid to exercise their constitutional responsibilities for fear of what the voters might do, sometimes they even insist that courts use balancing tests. They are only too happy to kick the ball into the courts.
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